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Director  
Intelligence Community Staff  
Washington, D.C. 20505

22 April 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: NFIP Program Managers

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures to Safeguard Sensitive  
US Intelligence Facilities Under a Prospective Strategic  
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) [REDACTED]

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1. As outlined in the attached point paper, the Community needs a security mechanism that can quickly alert the DCI to potential security threats to US intelligence facilities resulting either from candidate policy options to delimit Soviet on-site inspections under a prospective START treaty or from the inspections themselves. The intelligence programs and activities that are relevant here and must be protected are those that are both funded under the NFIP and fall under the DCI's purview to ensure that all aspects of their security are maintained. [REDACTED]

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2. The DCI has designated the Intelligence Community's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO) to be the focal point for identifying security problems arising from potential Soviet on-site inspections. Briefly, CCISCMO is establishing quickly a mechanism that would:

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SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures to Safeguard Sensitive  
US Intelligence Facilities Under a Prospective Strategic  
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) [redacted]

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
3. [redacted] of CCISCMO and [redacted] of CIA's Office of Security  
are working jointly on this effort pending agreement on the final mechanism.  
They would like to meet with the senior security officer from each NFIB  
program element to discuss in more detail the proposed security alert  
mechanism described above. This meeting is scheduled for 28 April (Thursday)  
from 1200 to 1400 hours [redacted]  
Please contact [redacted] CCISCMO on secure extension [redacted] with  
the name of your participant. [redacted]

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Edward J. Heinz  
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachment:  
Point Paper

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US Intelligence Facilities Under a Prospective Strategic  
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) [REDACTED]

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Attachment

ICS 3739-88

Point Paper Regarding  
US intelligence Concerns about the Impact of Soviet On-Site  
Inspections of US Facilities under a Prospective START Treaty

Issue:

- o US intelligence, DoD, the White House, and other elements of the Executive Branch need to consider how the US Government can interact effectively with US Government facilities and US industry to deal with potential security risks posed by Soviet on-site inspections related to START.

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Background:

- o The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will include provisions that will allow the US and the Soviet Union to conduct on-site inspections of facilities and locations on each other's territory.
- o These inspections could be in the following forms:
  - Baseline inspections of facilities and locations declared in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to verify the accuracy of information given in the MOU regarding presence of Treaty-limited items at the declared facilities and locations.
  - Short notice, challenge inspections, which are subject to annual quotas, of facilities and locations to verify whether changes have occurred regarding presence of Treaty-limited items at facilities and locations declared in the MOU.
  - Suspect site inspections that would permit the sides to inspect facilities and locations other than those declared in the MOU for evidence of covert production, storage, or deployment of Treaty-limited items.
- o Of primary concern to US intelligence is the suspect site inspection provision.
  - Although this form of inspection is generally regarded as permitting inspections anytime/anywhere, the US negotiating position on the table in Geneva would limit its application to facilities or locations operated by, controlled by, or under contract to the US Government.

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- This means that US Government and private corporations doing business with the government would be subject to these inspections. Thus, the potential security threat to national security programs is broader than just those in US Intelligence and DoD. Examples include:

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- o There is general consensus within the US Government that there be some safeguard to protect US sensitive facilities from Soviet inspectors.

- In addition, there is general support within the Intelligence Community that there be an explicit right to refuse a request for inspection as a means of protecting sensitive facilities.

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Solution for US Intelligence:

- o The Intelligence Community's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO) has been asked to cope with this problem for US intelligence.
  - CCISCMO is developing a mechanism for obtaining security information from both US Government facilities and corporate America where NFIP interests are potentially at risk.
  - US intelligence will use the security information provided through the CCISCMO mechanism relating to Soviet on-site inspections to evaluate the risks of a particular Soviet request and decide how to handle it (i.e., deny it, delay it, and so forth).
- o This mechanism will work for intelligence facilities, but it seems clear that a great deal more needs to be done on this issue across other government agencies.

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